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COMMENTS
MINDING THE GAP IN DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE LEGISLATION: SHOULD
STATES ADOPT COURSE OF CONDUCT
LAWS?
Teresa Manring*
In the United States, there is a gap between the way that sociologists,
psychologists, legal scholars, and advocates define domestic violence and
the way that criminal laws define domestic violence. Experts largely agree:
domestic violence occurs when a partner exercises continuous power and
control over the other. In this view, domestic violence occurs via a pattern of
abusive behaviors that unfolds over time, and its manifestations include both
physically-violent and emotionally-abusive behaviors. In contrast, criminal
statutes throughout the United States continue to conceptualize domestic
violence as single acts of physical violence or threats of physical violence.
During the past several years, England and Wales, Ireland, and Scotland
have passed laws that have attempted to bridge this gap in their own
societies. The enactment of these laws abroad—and the fact that legislatures
are considering similar laws in other jurisdictions, including the United
States—provides a timely opportunity to analyze whether state legislatures
should adopt similar laws here.
This Comment argues that states should adopt domestic violence laws
similar to the ones passed abroad. First, it explains why this gap between the
criminal law and other understandings of domestic violence emerged, what
it looks like in practice, and what its consequences are for victims throughout
* J.D., Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2021. My sincere gratitude
to Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer, for her guidance and feedback during the initial
drafting of this Comment. Thank you also to the members of the Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology for their thoughtful edits, comments, and support,
especially Ryan Neu, Leah Karchmer, Natalie Barnaby, and Emily Grant.
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their experience with the criminal justice system. Second, it draws attention
to the ways in which both the legislature and the criminal justice system are
growing increasingly comfortable with defining and prosecuting crimes as
courses of conduct. Based on the conduct covered and the harm addressed
under these already existing laws, introducing similar laws in the domestic
violence context would be a natural next step. Third, it evaluates course-ofconduct laws recently passed in Scotland, Ireland, and England and Wales
that have attempted to close this gap. Finally, it recommends that states pass
course-of-conduct domestic violence statutes, using Scotland’s law as a
model.
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INTRODUCTION
In the beginning, Natalie Curtis thought her boyfriend was just
extremely attentive.1 That explained the constant phone calls and the
1

I have reconstructed Natalie Curtis’s story using quotes and reporting from Jamie
Grierson’s and Ciara Nugent’s respective articles in The Guardian newspaper and TIME
magazine. Jamie Grierson, ‘This Is Not Love’: Victim of Coercive Control Says She Saw Red
Flags from Start, GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2019, 7:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society
/2019/jan/21/this-is-not-love-victim-of-coercive-control-says-she-saw-red-flags-from-start

2021]

MINDING THE GAP

775

questions: “What did you eat for lunch?” “Who did you see?” But, over time,
she noticed his behavior slowly become more alarming. He called her thirty
to forty times per day and then became angry when she did not pick up the
phone. He commented on what she ate. He took her things and threw them
outside the house. He screamed at her in public: “I hate you, fuck off.” And
he told her that his behavior was her fault. Eventually, four years into their
marriage, he tried to force her to sell her wedding and engagement ring.
In England and Wales, thanks to a “coercive control” law passed in
2015, Natalie’s husband’s controlling behavior during their relationship
constitutes a criminal offense.2 England and Wales’s law—along with similar
legislation passed in Scotland and Ireland—has attempted to address the full
picture of intimate partner violence.3 These laws view domestic violence as
a pattern of behavior employed to control victims.4 In contrast, almost all
domestic violence laws in the United States still define domestic violence as
consisting of only one, isolated act: most often, physical violence or the threat
of physical violence.5
Outside the legal sphere, the understanding of domestic violence in the
United States and these other countries is virtually the same. Sociologists,
psychologists, legal scholars, and advocates largely agree, and have for many
years: domestic violence occurs when one partner exercises continuous
power and control over the other.6 Yet, despite how well-established this
[https://perma.cc/34SZ-8ZFG]; Ciara Nugent, ‘Abuse Is a Pattern.’ Why These Nations Took
the Lead in Criminalizing Controlling Behavior in Relationships, TIME (June 21, 2019, 5:00
AM), https://time.com/5610016/coercive-control-domestic-violence/ [https://perma.cc/NS2N
-LUMU].
2
See infra Section II.C.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
See infra Sections I.B, II.A. Many state criminal statutes remain narrowly focused on
physical harm or threats of physical harm. But as will be explained further infra, the type of
conduct covered by some other statutes is broader.
6
See, e.g., Learn More: What Is Domestic Violence?, NAT’L COAL. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
https://ncadv.org/learn-more [https://perma.cc/N97M-VMK9] (“Domestic violence is the
willful intimidation, physical assault, battery, sexual assault, and/or other abusive behavior as
part of a systematic pattern of power and control perpetrated by one intimate partner against
another.”); AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMMITTEE OPINION: INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE 1 (2012), https://www.acog.org/Clinical-Guidance-and-Publications/
Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Health-Care-for-Underserved-Women/Intimate-Partner
-Violence [https://perma.cc/DL2G-6MQT] (“Intimate partner violence (IPV) is a pattern of
assaultive behavior and coercive behavior that may include physical injury, psychologic
abuse, sexual assault, progressive isolation, stalking, deprivation, intimidation, and
reproductive coercion.”). Until 2019, The U.S. Department of Justice also defined domestic
violence as “a pattern of abusive behavior in any relationship that is used by one partner to
gain or maintain power and control over another intimate partner.” Domestic Violence, U.S.
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premise is, criminal statutes throughout the United States continue to
conceptualize domestic violence as single acts of physical violence or threats
of physical violence.7
More than ten years ago, Professors Burke and Tuerkheimer analyzed
this “gap” in American law.8 In response, they proposed model course of
conduct statutes to close the gap.9 But no state adopted such a statute.10 The
enactment of course-of-conduct laws abroad—and the fact that other
jurisdictions, including in the United States, are considering similar laws11—
provides a timely opportunity to pick up where Professors Tuerkheimer and
Burke left off and propose, again, that states define domestic violence in
course-of-conduct terms.
This Comment advocates for a change in the way that state criminal
laws define domestic violence. Part I explains why this gap between the
criminal law and other understandings of domestic violence emerged, what
it looks like in practice, and what its consequences are for victims throughout
their experience with the criminal justice system. Part II first draws attention
to the ways in which both the legislature and the criminal justice system are
growing increasingly comfortable with defining and prosecuting crimes as
courses of conduct generally. It then suggests that, based on the conduct
covered and the harm addressed under these already existing laws,
introducing similar laws in the domestic violence context would be a natural
next step. Part II proceeds by introducing and evaluating laws recently passed
in Scotland, Ireland, and England and Wales that aimed to close this gap by
defining domestic violence in course-of-conduct terms. Finally, Part II
concludes by recommending that U.S. states pass similar laws, using
Scotland’s law as a model. Part III addresses challenges and
counterarguments to adopting and implementing course-of-conduct domestic
violence laws in the United States. The Comment concludes by emphasizing
that U.S. states must address the ways that transactional criminal statutes fail

DEP’T JUST. (June 16, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/ovw/domestic-violence [https://perma.c
c/2SBZ-TCCA].
7
See infra Sections I.B, II.A.
8
See infra Section I.B.
9
See infra Section I.B.
10
See infra Section I.B.
11
In April 2019, New York State Senator Kevin Parker introduced a bill that would make
coercive control a felony. S.B. S5306, 2019-2020 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019). The law defines
coercive control as when someone “engages in a course of conduct against a member of his or
her same family or household, without the victim’s consent, . . . which results in limiting or
restricting, in full or in part, the victim’s behavior, movement, associations or access to or use
of his or her own finances or financial information.” Id.
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domestic violence victims; the best path forward is to follow the leads of
countries that have adopted course-of-conduct laws.
During this analysis, I use the term “domestic violence” to refer to a
pattern of abusive and controlling behavior that occurs over time, including,
but not limited to, physical violence.12 I use the word “abuser” to refer to the
party attempting to exercise control over his partner. I also refer to the abuser
as he/him and the victim as she/her.13 Finally, I refer to individuals who
experience domestic violence as “victims.”14
I. BACKGROUND: THE SUCCESSES OF THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT AND THE
LIMITATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW
During the past 200 years, a radical transformation in the legal system’s
approach to physical violence in intimate relationships has occurred. Society
once viewed physical violence against a partner or spouse as a husband’s
prerogative, both legally and culturally. Now, society views physical
violence against a partner or spouse as a harm worthy of recourse. Although
the battle to make physical intimate relationship violence a crime has been
won, the current structure of those same criminal laws hinders prosecutors’
attempts to hold domestic violence perpetrators accountable and prevents
victims from seeking and achieving recourse.
12
Much research has been devoted to understanding different types of domestic violence.
What this paper calls “domestic violence,” other researchers have called coercive controlling
violence and intimate terrorism. See, e.g., EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL (2007); MICHAEL
P. JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTIMATE TERRORISM, VIOLENT
RESISTANCE, AND SITUATIONAL COUPLE VIOLENCE (2008). In a relationship characterized by
this type of violence, one partner continuously exercises power and control over the other
partner through some combination of emotional, psychological, physical, economic, and
sexual abuse. Joan B. Kelly & Michael P. Johnson, Domestic Violence: Differentiation Among
Types of Intimate Partner Violence: Research Update and Implications for Interventions, 46
FAM. CT. REV. 476, 481 (2008). Common tactics used by a coercive controller include
intimidation, isolation, blaming, and threats. Id. While coercive control can occur with or
without physical violence, the severity and frequency of violence in these types of
relationships tend to exceed that of other types. Id. at 483. And, unlike in situational couple
violence, the vast majority of coercive controllers are men. Id. at 482. In relationships
characterized by coercive controlling violence, victims can experience abuse so extreme that
some scholars have compared it to torture. See, e.g., LEWIS OKUN, WOMAN ABUSE: FACTS
REPLACING MYTHS 115–16 (1986) (“The battered woman’s situation obviously resembles that
of a prisoner subject to thought reform” because “[l]ike brainwashed captives, battered women
are subject to verbal abuse, beatings, other forms of physical abuse, and to confinement or
imprisonment.”).
13
See Kelly & Johnson, supra note 12, at 482.
14
While I realize the problematic nature of this term compared with “survivor,” the tragic
reality is that many women do not survive domestic violence. “Survivor” obscures this reality.
“Victim” does not.
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Section A briefly recounts the movement to criminalize domestic
violence. Section B then explains, drawing on Professors Tuerkheimer’s and
Burke’s scholarship, the ways in which current domestic violence statutes
misunderstand domestic violence and inhibit criminalizing domestic
violence as it actually occurs.
A. HOW DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BECAME A CRIME

Anglo-American common law created a hierarchy in the home, with the
husband as the master.15 His power included the right to “command his wife’s
obedience, and subject her to corporal punishment or ‘chastisement’ if she
defied his authority.”16 Thanks to the women’s rights movement, all judges
in the United States denounced this practice by the late nineteenth century.17
However, courts quickly found a new doctrine that enforced male hierarchy
in the domestic sphere: privacy.18 As one example, a North Carolina judge
wrote that when it came to violence in the home, except in cases of permanent
injury or “dangerous” violence, “it is better to draw the curtain, shut out the
public gaze, and leave the parties to forget and forgive.”19 In this way, the
law defined domestic violence as a place where the criminal law could not—
indeed should not—reach.
During the 1970s, the women’s movement sought to reform this area of
the law.20 They argued that physical violence between intimate partners was
just as serious as the physical violence that occurred in any other context and
sought to compel courts and law enforcement to treat it that way.21 Although
feminists challenged substantive law during this time by, among other
strategies, petitioning states to add domestic violence statutes to their civil
and criminal codes, many of the movement’s goals and victories were
procedural and remedial.22 For example, in response to police departments’
failures to arrest perpetrators of domestic violence, activists sought to
implement pro-arrest mandates and even mandatory-arrest policies.23
Reva B. Siegal, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2122–23 (1996).
16
Id. at 2123.
17
Id. at 2129 (“By the 1870s, there was no judge or treatise writer in the United States
who recognized a husband’s prerogative to chastise his wife.”).
18
Id. at 2120.
19
Id. at 2158 (quoting State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61–62 (1874)).
20
See CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, LAURA A. ROSENBURY, DEBORAH TUERKHEIMER &
KIMBERLY A. YURACKO, FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 249–50 (5th ed.
2018).
21
Id. at 249–51.
22
See id.
23
Id. at 251.
15
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Within that context, seeking to compel state actors to enforce laws
prohibiting physical violence that were already on the books in the domestic
context made perfect sense.24 And thanks to those measures, physical
violence against women in the home is now a criminal offense that, when
reported, law enforcement and courts take more seriously. However, that
tremendous achievement left a problematic legacy: the notion that domestic
violence necessarily must involve physical violence. This idea has been
entrenched firmly in the law, even while society’s understanding of domestic
violence’s nature has continued to evolve.
B. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IS NOT AN ISOLATED INCIDENT

The traditional framework of criminal law presents its own barrier to
criminalizing domestic violence as it actually occurs.25 Criminal law
conceptualizes domestic violence as discrete incidents of physical violence,
largely ignoring motivation, history, and context.26 This is consistent with the
traditional tenets of criminal law, which historically viewed crimes as single
incidents that occur at discrete moments.27 Accordingly, criminal law does
not naturally lend itself to proscribing harmful behavior that unfolds
continuously and repeatedly over time.28
Meanwhile, outside of the legal context, domestic violence is commonly
defined in terms of its intent or effect—control—and the repetitive, patterned
nature of the abuser’s conduct.29 And in the real world, an abuser’s pattern of
behavior toward his partner is not limited to physical acts of violence or
threats of physical violence.30 Rather, common tactics abusers use also
24
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to
Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 970 (2004) [hereinafter
Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering] (“Confronting a legal
apparatus wholly unresponsive to battering, domestic violence advocates focused their reform
efforts, quite sensibly, on forcing police and prosecutors to enforce the laws already on the
books; that is, to treat crimes ‘equally’ whether the victim and perpetrator were strangers or
intimates.”).
25
Id. at 971–74.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 972.
28
Id.
29
See supra text accompanying note 6.
30
The Duluth Model’s power and control wheel, which collects common tactics used by
abusers, lists controlling what the victim does, who she sees, calling her names, intimidating
her through damage and destruction to property, preventing her from getting a job, not
allowing her to access income and other resources, and threatening to commit suicide, among
other tactics. Power and Control Wheel, DOMESTIC ABUSE INTERVENTION PROGRAMS,
[hereinafter Duluth, Power and Control Wheel], https://www.theduluthmodel.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/03/PowerandControl.pdf [https://perma.cc/NCD3-JQJK].
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include controlling what the victim does and who she sees, verbal abuse and
name-calling, intimidation, and economic control and coercion, among
others. Trying to use existing criminal laws to prosecute domestic violence
is therefore like trying “to fit the square peg of domestic violence into the
existing round hole of the penal code.”31
Addressing domestic violence with incident-oriented statutes conceals
the continuous, patterned reality of abuse as many victims experience it, as
well as the psychological and emotional abuse that occurs during the periods
between, or in many cases instead of, occurrences of physical abuse.32 It
ignores that physical violence, in the domestic context, occurs more than
once the majority of the time.33 It ignores that domestic violence endures. It
does not begin and end in seconds; it progresses, and often escalates, over
months and years.34
Furthermore, statutes that define domestic violence as isolated incidents
of physical violence do not account for what motivates abusers—power and
control. They also leave out the many other strategies that abusers use to
control their victims. Physical violence may be an infrequent or minor
strategy or may not be used at all.35 In fact, abusers may only become
physically violent when they cannot control their victims by other means. 36
These statutes also ignore the root of victims’ suffering, since many victims
describe psychological and emotional abuse as more harmful than physical
violence.37 As Professor Tuerkheimer wrote, there is a “vast range of
suffering—amidst and beyond the physical abuse . . . where the criminal law
‘does not go.’”38 Domestic violence statutes do not actually address the
reality of domestic violence; instead, they erase both abusers’ perpetration
and victims’ experiences of it.
The law’s misunderstanding of domestic violence leads to perverse and
absurd consequences. For instance, criminal law, as it stands in many states,
sees no difference between an individual who smashed a glass on a stranger
one evening during a bar fight and an abuser who, over a period of years,
stopped allowing his partner access to her finances, controlled how she
31

Alafair Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An Alternative
Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 552, 566 (2007).
32
See Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering, supra note 24, at
972–74.
33
See supra note 12.
34
Burke, supra note 31, at 567–68.
35
Id. at 570–71.
36
See STARK, supra note 12, at 13–14.
37
Id.
38
Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering, supra note 24, at 966.

2021]

MINDING THE GAP

781

dressed, isolated her from her friends and family, verbally abused her, and
then smashed a glass over her head when she challenged his authority. If the
victims in both cases brought charges, prosecutors might approach the cases
practically identically. But they are different. One is an isolated outburst of
aggression. It starts and finishes in seconds. The other is only one tactic an
abuser uses as part of his broader exercise of power and control over his
victim. The smashing of the glass may have started and finished in seconds,
but the abuse itself is continuous: it lasts for weeks, months, years.
This misunderstanding of domestic violence creates obstacles for
victims from start to finish in a criminal case.39 It begins with the fact that,
after enduring abuse at her partner’s hands for years, the criminal justice
system is only interested in the most recent incident of abuse or whichever
incident brought the victim into the system. As such, a prosecutor may only
ask her about that particular incident and not the long cycle of abuse she has
suffered through.40 If the victim volunteers information about prior abusive
behaviors, the prosecutor, relying on the laws as written, will see these
incidents as distinct, isolated, unconnected, and only relevant if they lend
themselves to bringing additional charges. The prosecutor might press her on
the details: What date? What time? In which room? Did anyone else see it?
What happened before and after? But, for victims whose abusers subject
them to repeated, continuous abuse, it may be very difficult, if not
impossible, to recall those details.41
This focus on a single incident affects the charges the prosecutor can
bring, the sentence the court can give the abuser, the evidence and arguments
that prosecutors can present at trial, and the likelihood that a jury or judge
convicts the abuser.42 Prosecutors must present a coherent story to persuade
a jury.43 In the domestic violence context, such a story would recount both
the continuous, repetitive nature of the abuse the victim has suffered, as well
as the perpetrator’s motivations: power and control.44 But when the crime’s
structure makes this crucial context irrelevant, prosecutors can only present
disjointed fragments of the victim’s story in court.45 Without the context that

39

See id. at 975–89 (describing in detail the ways in which the law’s limited definition of
domestic violence warps the criminal process for victims).
40
Id. at 977–80.
41
Id. at 979. Thus, even if the victim describes conduct that is criminal, the criminal justice
system may still offer no recourse if she cannot remember enough details about the incident
to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the abuse occurred.
42
Id. at 980–81.
43
Id. at 980–82.
44
Id. at 980–87.
45
See id.
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connects these incidents, the story may leave the jury confused and
unconvinced.46
To solve these problems, Professors Tuerkheimer and Burke proposed
that legislators replace our current, transactional domestic violence statutes
with course-of-conduct domestic violence statutes.47 Course-of-conduct
statutes allow juries to convict when they find that a defendant has engaged
in a criminal “course of conduct”—a series of acts committed over a period
of time that have continuity of purpose.48 In the domestic violence context,
course-of-conduct statutes possess a number of advantages over transactional
statutes. On a general level, because course-of-conduct statutes criminalize a
series of acts, they may be better-suited to address crimes like domestic
violence, which often occur as a pattern connected of behaviors. And, as I
will explain further infra,49 course-of-conduct statutes are also well-suited to
address some of the other shortcomings of current domestic violence
legislation. Specifically, course-of-conduct statutes could make the
relationship between the perpetrator and the victim relevant, reject the notion
that physical violence is at the core of domestic violence, recognize that
domestic violence stems from abusers’ desire to gain power and control over
their victims, and, accordingly, allow victims greater access to justice.50
Thus, as Professor Tuerkheimer explained, this type of statute would better
capture the nature and harm of domestic violence and would represent “the
next stage in the evolution of law’s growing responsiveness to harms suffered
by women.”51
Although Professors Tuerkheimer’s and Burke’s proposed statutes
contained significant differences, both models reflected the repetitive,
patterned nature of domestic violence and emphasized, in some way, the
underlying dynamics of power and control.52 At the time, however, these
proposals did not gain traction.

46

Id.
Id. at 1019–22; Burke, supra note 31, at 601–03.
48
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW, § 3-801 (West 2002) (defining “course of
conduct” as “a persistent pattern of conduct, composed of a series of acts over time, that shows
a continuity of purpose”); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.225 (2017) (defining “course of conduct” as
“a pattern of conduct composed of two or more acts . . . over a period of time, however short,
evidencing a continuity of purpose”).
49
See infra Sections II.B, II.C, and II.D.
50
See Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering, supra note 24, at
1030–31.
51
Id. at 1019.
52
See id.; see also Burke, supra note 31, at 601–02.
47
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II. CHANGES IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW
Significant changes have occurred in this area of the law since
Professors Tuerkheimer’s and Burke’s proposals. In recent years, states have
started to modify their domestic violence statutes in ways that suggest the
extra-legal definition of domestic violence—that is, the view that domestic
violence is a pattern of behavior—is finally starting to seep into the legal
sphere. At the same time, prosecuting crimes as courses of conduct is
becoming increasingly common in the criminal justice system. In particular,
many state laws define some crimes that frequently occur between former
intimate partners or in otherwise intimate relationships—such as stalking,
harassment, and sexual abuse of a child—in course-of-conduct terms.
Meanwhile, across the pond, England and Wales, Ireland, and Scotland have
passed and implemented legislation that defines “coercive control” of
intimate partners as a course-of-conduct crime.
This Part will describe and discuss these changes. Section A will discuss
state approaches to domestic violence that, in small ways, break the mold of
the transactional, physical-harm-focused domestic violence statutes
discussed in Part I. It will also demonstrate how these statutes identify both
emotional harm and controlling behavior as worthy of recourse. Section B
will discuss course-of-conduct crimes that the criminal justice system already
uses to prosecute behavior in contexts that bear important similarities to
domestic violence. Section C will discuss recently passed domestic violence
legislation in England and Wales, Scotland, and Ireland and analyze the
benefits and downsides of each of these approaches. Ultimately, this
Comment argues that adopting a domestic violence course-of-conduct
statute, modelled after Scotland’s law, is the best path forward.
A. STATE CRIMINAL STATUTES RECOGNIZING EMOTIONAL HARM
AND CONTROLLING BEHAVIOR

Although the basic structure of U.S. domestic violence statutes has not
changed,53 the types of conduct these statutes cover has evolved. Although
some state criminal statutes are still narrowly focused on conduct that
threatens or causes physical harm,54 others have taken a broader view on the
type of behaviors that can constitute domestic violence. Examples include
53

See supra Part I.
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-918, https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/title18
/t18ch9/sect18-918/ [https://perma.cc/F8H4-RW9G] (criminalizing only battery and assault);
IOWA CODE § 236.2, https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/236.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/LCU
9-QAGG] (criminalizing only assault); KAN. STAT. § 60-3102, https://www.ksrevisor.org/
statutes/chapters/ch60/060_031_0002.html [https://perma.cc/CZU9-5ABJ] (criminalizing on
ly conduct causing bodily injury or causing fear of bodily injury).
54
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trespass,55 harassment,56 theft,57 interfering with an emergency call,58 and
damaging or destroying property59 (including harming pets).60 The inclusion
of these crimes that are not physically violent in statutes defining domestic
violence suggests that lawmakers are starting to recognize that there are
criminal forms of domestic violence that do not cause physical harm to
victims but that perpetrators instead intend to control and intimidate victims.
Killing and cruelty to animals, in particular, are common techniques used by
abusers to establish control over their victims.61
A small number of state laws make the connection between domestic
violence and controlling behavior even more explicit. One example is
Colorado, which defines domestic violence as any “crime against a person,
or against property, including an animal . . . when used as a method of
coercion, control, punishment, intimidation, or revenge directed against a
person with whom the actor is or has been involved in an intimate
relationship.”62 And in Missouri, a person commits a misdemeanor when he
or she “knowingly attempts to cause or causes the isolation of such domestic
victim by unreasonably and substantially restricting or limiting his or her
access to other persons, telecommunication devices or transportation for the
purpose of isolation.”63
Similarly, New York recently amended its domestic violence statute to
include forms of economic abuse.64 The statute now includes identity theft,
55

See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-10 (LEXIS through 2019 Legis. Sess.).
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (LEXIS through 2019 Legis. Sess.).
57
Id.
58
See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. § 720 5/12-3.5 (2011); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2016).
59
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-800.3 (LEXIS through 2019 Legis. Sess.).
60
Id.
61
Vivek Upadhya, The Abuse of Animals as a Method of Domestic Violence: The Need
for Criminalization, 63 EMORY L.J. 1163, 1164 (2014) (“Abusers frequently threaten or harm
an animal as a method of harming a human victim, or as a method of establishing control,
gaining revenge, or coercing compliance with a particular demand.”).
62
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-800.3.
63
MO. REV. STAT. § 565.076(1)(6) (2014).
64
N.Y. S.B. 2625. Leg. Sess. 2019-2020 (N.Y. 2019), https://legislation.nysenate.gov/pd
f/bills/2019/S2625 [https://perma.cc/58Z7-NNQ4]. Economic abuse occurs when one partner
limits the other’s access to financial resources. Arianne Renan Barzilay, Power in the Age of
In/Equality: Economic Abuse, Masculinities, and the Long Road to Marriage Equality, 51
AKRON L. REV. 323, 329 (2017). Examples include preventing or forbidding the victim to
work, sabotaging her employment, making unilateral financial decisions, providing the victim
with an allowance when the couple is wealthy, not allowing the victim to have her own credit
card or bank account, stealing money, liquidating joint accounts, signing up for a credit card
in the victim’s name, and forcing the victim to take out loans on behalf of the abuser, among
many others. Id.; see also Angela Littwin, Coerced Debt: The Role of Consumer Credit in
Domestic Violence, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 951, 954 (2012).
56
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grand larceny, and coercion as domestic violence crimes.65 The inclusion of
economic crimes in domestic violence statutes makes the power and control
aspect of domestic violence clear because financial abuse makes victims
dependent on their abusers in such a direct, cognizable way. While there may
still be some confusion in the popular imagination about “why she doesn’t
just leave” in situations where an abuser is physically violent, where an
abuser financially abuses a woman, the answer is clear: she does not leave
because she cannot.66 The abuser controls the finances, making the victim
financially dependent on the abuser, and, accordingly, she lacks the
necessary resources to leave.67
The bill’s history demonstrates that the New York legislature recognizes
that power and control motivate abusers. In fact, members of the New York
assembly justified the bill in part because “economic abuse frequently
accompanies other forms of domestic abuse perpetrated by abusers, in the
family violence context, to exercise power and control over their victims and
their finances.”68 The statute itself, though, says nothing about power or
control, and the statute’s incident-oriented structure continues to isolate
economic abuse from other abusive behaviors.69 Extending domestic
violence’s definition to reach behaviors such as economic abuse and harm to
pets suggests that legislators are willing to acknowledge the reality that
abusers use a wide range of techniques to control their victims. But without
recognizing the patterned, repetitive nature of domestic violence and the
underlying intent connecting these techniques, prosecutors will continue to
handle these individual crimes in a way that ignores the larger context in
which abuse occurs.

65

N.Y. S.B. 2625.
Appropriately, one of the stated justifications for the bill was that “[e]conomic abuse is
a tactic commonly used by abusers to control their victim’s finances and prevent them from
leaving an abusive relationship.” New York State Assembly Memorandum in Support of
Legislation, N.Y. A.B. A07400 (N.Y. 2019) [hereinafter N.Y. State Assembly Memorandum
in Support of Legislation], https://nyassembly.gov/leg/?default_fld=&leg_video=&bn=A0
7400&term=2013&Memo=Y&Text=Y [https://perma.cc/8QE6-2RG4].
67
See Dana Harrington Conner, Financial Freedom: Women, Money, and Domestic
Abuse, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 339, 357 (2014) (“Financial impediments play a major
role in restricting a woman who experiences intimate partner violence from initially gaining
freedom from the abusive relationship. Moreover, financial instability is one of the greatest
reasons why, after gaining freedom, a woman has limited choices and may ultimately
acquiesce to an abuser’s attempts at reconciliation.”).
68
N.Y. State Assembly Memorandum in Support of Legislation, supra note 66.
69
See supra Part I.B.
66
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There is, however, one state criminal statute that does recognize that
domestic violence can occur as a pattern of connected behaviors.70
Washington state’s sentencing guidelines allow for more severe sentencing
of domestic violence perpetrators where an ongoing pattern of physical,
sexual, or psychological abuse is part of their criminal conduct.71 The
guidelines also allow for harsher sentencing when the defendant’s conduct is
“deliberately cruel.” Although this language relates to sentencing and does
not define domestic violence itself, it may be the closest any state law gets to
acknowledging how abusers carry out domestic violence and what motivates
them.
First, the sentencing guidelines recognize that domestic violence—in its
view, more severe iterations—involves more than a single incident, or even
a series of one-off, unconnected, transactional offenses. The choice of the
word “pattern” in the guidelines implies that what drives the higher
sentencing is not only the number of incidents, but also that these incidents
are connected. Furthermore, the guidelines reject the notion that domestic
violence is limited to physical violence and open the door for courts to
consider evidence of abuse that courts would not otherwise consider relevant
or admissible. They do this by defining the pattern to include not just physical
and sexual abuse, but also psychological abuse, and by allowing for harsher
sentences when the defendant is deliberately cruel.
For example, in State v. Durall,72 the Washington Court of Appeals
upheld a trial court’s finding of an ongoing pattern of psychological abuse
where Durall treated his wife of twelve years, Carolyn, in ways that were
“controlling and extremely jealous.”73 Durall took Carolyn’s credit card,
went through her wallet, forbade her from opening a separate bank account,
70
Although this Comment focuses specifically on the criminal law, it is worth mentioning
that the definition of domestic violence as a pattern of behavior appears to be making its way
into noncriminal statutes. As one example, in September 2020, Hawaii passed a law adding
“coercive control” to its definition of “domestic abuse.” Melena Ryzik & Katie Benner, What
Defines Domestic Abuse? Survivors Say It’s More than Assault, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/22/us/cori-bush-fka-twigs-coercive-control.html?referrin
gSource=articleShare [https://perma.cc/ZR47-AH9U]. The law defines “[c]oercive control”
as “a pattern of threatening, humiliating, or intimidating actions, which may include assaults,
or other abuse that is used to harm, punish, or frighten an individual [including] a pattern of
behavior that seeks to take away the individual’s liberty or freedom and strip away the
individual’s sense of self . . . .” H.B. 2425, 30th Legis. Sess. (Haw. 2020). But the new
definition only applies to laws pertaining to insurance policies and domestic abuse protective
orders—not the criminal law. See id.
71
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.99.100(1)(b) (2010), https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx
?cite=10.99.100 [https://perma.cc/X3Q2-63G3].
72
No. 47928-8-I, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 711 (Wash. Ct. App. May 5, 2003).
73
Id. at *10.
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monitored her phone calls and email account, and did not let her leave his
side during social events.74 At the sentencing hearing, the trial court admitted
into evidence letters Carolyn had written describing Durall’s behavior and
testimony from Carolyn’s friends and coworkers.75 Carolyn herself could not
testify; Durall had murdered her.76
Similarly, in State v. Zatkovich,77 the Washington Court of Appeals
upheld the trial court’s finding of an ongoing pattern of psychological abuse
where Zatkovich engaged in a number of “assaultive, harassing, and
stalking” behaviors that caused “fear and mental torment” in the victim—his
ex-wife Christy.78 His abusive behaviors included, on various occasions,
visiting Christy’s house at three o’clock in the morning, turning off her
home’s heating, forcing her car off the road, and threatening to cut her throat
and watch her bleed to death.79 Additionally, in considering whether
Zatkovich’s behavior was deliberately cruel enough to justify an aggravated
sentence, the court noted that, on one occasion, Zatkovich left Christy on the
side of the road and then told her son that she was dead.80 The court also
emphasized that Zatkovich hit Christy while she was pregnant and told her
that he wished that she and her baby were dead.81 Then, shortly after she gave
birth, he threatened to kill himself and her children.82
The Washington Court of Appeals’ analyses in Durall and Zatkovich
make clear that the degree of an abuser’s criminal culpability does not have
to be rooted in physical violence. Furthermore, the range of evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearings in Durall and Zatkovich provides a
glimpse into the type of story a prosecutor could tell at trial if domestic
violence laws made the periods before, between, and after incidents of
physical violence relevant. The details about Durall taking Carolyn’s credit
card and not allowing her to leave his side at parties, and Zatkovich’s
abandoning of Christy on the side of the road and threatening to kill himself
point directly to their respective attempts to control their victims. But
74

Id.
Id.
76
Id. at *1. In the days after Durall murdered Carolyn, he told their children that their
mother had suddenly and deliberately abandoned them. Id. at *12. On appeal, Durall contested
the trial court’s ongoing pattern of psychological abuse finding, arguing that his behavior was
“merely indicative of a dysfunctional relationship.” Id. at *10. The court rejected this defense.
Id.
77
52 P.3d 36 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
78
Id. at 38.
79
Id. at 41–42.
80
Id. at 42.
81
Id.
82
Id.
75
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ultimately, like transactional domestic violence statutes, Washington’s
sentencing statute omits this crucial context from the trial stage.
There is an additional problem with the sentencing statute. A finding of
“deliberate cruelty” requires that “the cruelty must be of a kind not usually
associated with the commission of the offense in question.”83 However, in
Zatkovich, the instances the court mentioned as examples of “excessive
cruelty” were, in fact, part and parcel of domestic violence. Threatening to
kill oneself and threatening to take the children are common techniques
abusers use to control their victims. 84 Furthermore, some research suggests
that, rather than being exceptional, pregnant women are at least as likely to
experience domestic violence than women who are not pregnant, if not more
likely.85 This is not to suggest that this behavior was not deplorable, or that
the harm to the victim was not severe, but rather that the abuser’s behavior is
not exceptional given how common these types of abusive tactics are. A
domestic violence statute that makes context relevant would reveal this, since
it would become apparent at the trial stage that domestic violence frequently
includes the type of cruelty the Zatkovich court found to be exceptional.
Overall, the statutes above represent a step in the right direction. They
constitute a formal, legal recognition that domestic violence is not confined
to the physical, and, in the Washington example, even that domestic
violence’s “patterned” nature makes it unlike some other forms of violence.
Additionally, they suggest that messages from social scientists and others
may be slowly getting through to lawmakers. But, functionally, because they
largely do not integrate intent and repetition into the definition of the crimes,
these statutes continue to omit the dynamics of power and control that are
central to domestic violence. Accordingly, having seen that traditional,
transactional crimes do not adequately describe or remedy domestic
violence’s harm, I will next consider course-of-conduct crimes, which might
provide a solution.
B. COURSE OF CONDUCT CRIMES

Recall that the criminal law has a clear preference for defining crimes
as discrete, singular incidents.86 There are some crimes that break this mold.
Course-of-conduct crimes allow juries to convict when they find that a

83

Id. (citations omitted).
See Duluth, Power and Control Wheel, supra note 30.
85
Beth A. Bailey, Partner Violence During Pregnancy: Prevalence, Effects, Screening,
and Management, 2 INT’L J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 183, 184 (2010).
86
See supra Section I.B.
84
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defendant has engaged in a criminal “course of conduct”—a series of acts
over a period of time that have continuity of purpose.87
The justifications for defining crimes in a course-of-conduct manner are
various and crime-specific. Generally, though, legislatures create course-ofconduct crimes to fill gaps left between the criminal code’s collection of
discrete, separate crimes. For example, when Congress passed the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), it addressed a gap in
the enforcement of enterprise or group crime.88 Although RICO may be the
most well-known course-of-conduct crime, framing criminal offenses in this
way has become a fairly common way to define crimes that occur within the
context of familial and intimate relationships. Stalking, harassment, sex
trafficking, private torture, and sexual abuse of a child are all examples. This
Section will demonstrate that domestic violence bears important similarities
to other course-of-conduct crimes that the law already recognizes, both in
terms of the problems they were passed to address, and in terms of the nature
of the crimes themselves. The existence of these crimes suggests that
prosecutors are familiar enough with course-of-conduct crimes that the
creation of another would not be problematic or confusing to apply. Stalking
and sexual abuse of a child statutes are particularly important to this analysis,
as they address “gaps” in the law that are most similar to the gap that exists
in the domestic violence context.
1. Stalking
Stalking laws differ state by state, but, generally speaking, they
criminalize a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause
a reasonable person to feel fearful, intimidated, or suffer serious emotional
distress.89 The statutes generally do not specify the precise type of conduct
that the perpetrator must engage in, nor do they focus on the stalker’s intent.
In addition, no state stalking statute requires that the victim suffer physical
harm, and the vast majority reject the notion that fear of physical violence is
the only type of fear that deserves recourse.90 Prosecutors generally do not
87
See, e.g., M.D. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW, § 3-801 (West 2002) (defining “course of
conduct” as “a persistent pattern of conduct, composed of a series of acts over time, that shows
a continuity of purpose”); MO. Rev. STAT. § 565.225 (2017) (defining “course of conduct” as
“a pattern of conduct composed of two or more acts . . . over a period of time, however short,
evidencing a continuity of purpose”).
88
See Burke, supra note 31, at 589–90; see also Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and
Remedying the Harm of Battering, supra note 24, at 1020–21, 1021 n.329.
89
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 210-A (1995), http://www.mainelegislature.
org/legis/statutes/17-a/title17-asec210-a.html [https://perma.cc/BVD2-7PMX].
90
But see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3(A) (West 2016) (requiring that the victim fear
death, sexual assault, or bodily injury to herself or to a family member).
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bring stalking charges when the case involves current intimate partners. 91
Nonetheless, of the two crimes analyzed in this Section, stalking is the most
similar to domestic violence. Stalking and domestic violence are similar in
terms of conduct, context, the involved parties’ identities, and the distinct
type of harm they cause. Most importantly, they are similar in that
transactional criminal statutes cannot cover the full extent of their conduct or
the harms they cause.92
The rationale and context behind passing stalking laws apply in full
force in the domestic violence context. Until the early 1990s, prosecutors
prosecuted stalking behaviors that now constitute part of a course of conduct
of stalking individually, usually as misdemeanors.93 These included
harassment, menacing, loitering, trespassing, and terroristic threatening.94 As
one scholar wrote at the time, there was a “gap in the law, leaving victims of
stalking without an adequate legal recourse against their pursuers. Stalking
laws represent a new attempt to fill this void.”95 Scholars additionally
observed that criminalizing these offenses separately—even when they
occurred repeatedly and offenders directed them at a particular person—
demonstrated that “legislators failed to recognize the commonality between
the behaviors . . . .”96 Similarly, as we have seen, domestic violence statutes
treat incidents where one partner threatens or physically harms the others as
isolated, when in fact, because these incidents are rooted in one intimate
partner’s attempt to control the other, they are inherently connected to a range
of other harmful behaviors.97
Before legislatures enacted stalking laws, the law did not recognize that
repeated stalking behaviors, directed at a particular person, triggered harm
that was both greater than and distinct from the harm caused by the isolated
perpetration of these individual crimes.98 Similarly, as Evan Stark has written
in the domestic violence context, “sheer repetition is not the issue.”99 Instead,
the issue is that the abuser is harming the same person over and over again,
91

See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Breakups, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 55–58 (2013)
[hereinafter Tuerkheimer, Breakups].
92
See id. at 52 (“In its approach to stalking, the law adopts a model of crime that,
nomenclature aside, seems more closely aligned with the realities of domestic violence.”).
93
Kathleen G. McAnaney, Laura A. Curliss & C. Elizabeth Abeyta-Price,
From Imprudence to Crime: Anti-Stalking Laws, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 819, 824 (1993).
94
Id. at 821 (citations omitted).
95
Robert A. Guy, Jr., The Nature and Constitutionality of Stalking Laws, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 991, 1000 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
96
Id. at 906.
97
See supra Sections I.B, II.A.
98
McAnaney, Curliss & Abeyta-Price, supra note 93, at 883.
99
STARK, supra note 12, at 94.
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“giving abuse a cumulative effect that is far greater than the mere sum of its
parts.”100 Furthermore, “minor” stalking behaviors can culminate in acts of
horrendous violence against victims. But when the law viewed those
behaviors as isolated and unconnected, it could not intervene in any
protective way until an attack actually occurred.101 Similarly, laws that
conceptualize domestic violence as isolated incidents rather than patterns of
behavior fail to recognize that abuse escalates, and, accordingly, that the
danger to victims grows.
Stalking and domestic violence are also similar in terms of the parties’
identities, the conduct perpetrators engage in, and the effects that conduct has
on victims. Stalkers are often their victims’ former intimate partners, seeking
to establish or reestablish control over their victims.102 Although states
prosecute stalking as if it cannot occur between current intimate partners, in
fact, stalking behaviors can begin at the start of a relationship, and domestic
violence can continue during and after the breakup.103 Thus, stalkers are often
abusers and vice versa.
Examining the behaviors and tactics that stalkers and abusers employ
makes this clear.104 Unwanted telephone calls and communications,
spreading rumors, threats, spying, and following victims all occur in both the
stalking and domestic violence contexts. For instance, an abuser may follow
the victim throughout the house and demand to know what she is doing, or,
when she is outside the home, demand to know her whereabouts.105 Recent
innovations in surveillance technology have further conflated these two
crimes, as both abusers and stalkers use surveillance and tracking devices to
pursue, intimidate, and control their victims.106
100

Id.
Guy, supra note 95, at 999.
102
See Tuerkheimer, Breakups, supra note 91, at 54.
103
Id. at 55–58.
104
A 2009 report from the U.S. Department of Justice notes that common stalking
behaviors include making unwanted phone calls and communicating with victims in other
unsolicited ways, spreading rumors, and following or spying on victims. KATRINA BAUM,
SHANNAN CATALANO, MICHAEL RAND & KRISTINA ROSE, BUREAU JUST. STATS., STALKING
VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 1 (2009), https://www.justice.gov/si
tes/default/files/ovw/legacy/2012/08/15/bjs-stalking-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VRZ-APDZ].
105
See Tuerkheimer, Breakups, supra note 91, at 60–61.
106
See, e.g., Kate Lyons, Stalkers Using Bugging Devices and Spyware to Monitor
Victims, GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/
feb/13/stalkers-using-bugging-devices-and-spyware-to-monitor-victims [https://perma.cc/D2
XD-JDK5] (reporting that stalkers are using apps and other bugging devices to monitor their
victims); Aarti Shahani, Smartphones Are Used to Stalk, Control Domestic Abuse Victims,
NPR (Sept. 15, 2014, 4:22 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/09/15
/346149979/smartphones-are-used-to-stalk-control-domestic-abuse-victims [https://perma.cc
101
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However, even though the two crimes bear clear similarities, stalking
laws cannot perfectly fill the gaps in domestic violence law. For one thing,
prosecutors generally do not use stalking laws to prosecute domestic
violence.107 For another, stalking laws may not reach all types of abuse that
domestic violence victims experience. As an example, stalking laws likely
would not cover economic abuse—one of the most common strategies
abusers employ. And finally, one important function of the criminal law is
that it expresses and codifies what society condemns.108 Using stalking laws
to prosecute domestic violence, especially given those laws’ stranger and
post-breakup connotations, leaves a question as to whether society also
condemns abuse that occurs between persons in a relationship.
Accordingly, in stalking laws, the criminal law already recognizes a
crime that features conduct and harms similar to those in the domestic
violence context. The introduction of a course-of-conduct domestic violence
statute would therefore not introduce a type of crime with which the criminal
justice system is not already familiar.
2. Sexual Abuse of a Child
A second crime that bears important similarities to domestic violence is
sexual abuse of a child. California’s legal treatment of this crime is
particularly relevant since it criminalizes “continuous” sexual abuse of a
child, defined as three or more acts of sexual conduct with a child under the
age of fourteen during a three month period or more.109 Prosecuting child
molesters presents evidentiary challenges that are similar to those faced by
prosecutors of domestic violence.110 The California statute, in particular,
addresses the specific problem of children who have been sexually abused
/35DG-J9NS] (reporting that abusers are using apps and other digital tools to follow and
monitor their victims).
107
See Tuerkheimer, Breakups, supra note 91, at 71. Professor Tuerkheimer made this
observation in 2007, but I have found no evidence that prosecutors have started using stalking
laws to prosecute domestic violence since then.
108
See Henry Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405
(1958) (“What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction . . . is the judgment of community
condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition.”).
109
CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.5(a) (1872) (amended 2006), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.go
v/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=288.5.&lawCode=PEN [https://perma.cc/
X6FT-3SZL].
110
See Brian Bah, Jury Unanimity and the Problem with Specificity: Trying to Understand
What Jurors Must Agree About by Examining the Problem of Prosecuting Child Molesters, 91
TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1205 (2013) (“[Child sexual abuse] statutes are meant to battle a difficulty
in convicting child molesters: many of these cases revolve around alleged repeated sexual
abuse with only generic evidence available since the child in question has difficulty providing
event-specific evidence.”).
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repeatedly by adults but cannot remember the specific dates on which the
assaults occurred or recall other significant details related to the assaults. In
response to this problem, the statute does not require the jury to unanimously
agree on the same three predicate acts.111 Instead, the jury must only agree
that three acts of sexual abuse occurred.112
California courts have also applied this logic to domestic violence cases,
reasoning that both involve repetitive conduct, “[b]oth the victim of spousal
and of child abuse are likely to be unwilling to report their abuse to the
authorities due to fear of physical and/or emotional retaliation on the part of
the attackers[,]” and “[b]oth patterns of behavior are based on controlling
another individual through violence.”113 Although the California Court of
Appeals in that case did not mention it, domestic violence victims face
similar difficulties in recalling specific incidents of abuse.114 Accordingly,
conceptualizing domestic violence as a course-of-conduct crime may help to
address this common evidentiary obstacle.
C. RECENTLY PASSED INTERNATIONAL LAWS

The United States is, of course, far from the only country where a gap
in domestic violence law exists. In recent years, though, other countries and
jurisdictions have introduced and passed legislation to fill this gap.
Specifically, England and Wales, Ireland, and Scotland have all passed
criminal laws to address the limitations of transactional, physical-harm
focused statutes. In advocating for and passing these laws, government
officials and law enforcement have explicitly cited a number of the concerns
discussed in this Comment. In particular, the goals of these new laws
included linking the government’s definition of domestic abuse to the

111

§ 288.5(b).
Id.
113
People v. Thompson, 160 Cal. App. 3d 220, 222 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
114
See Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering, supra note 24,
at 979 (“The patterned, on-going nature of domestic violence makes [recalling specific
incidents of abuse] an often insurmountable obstacle. Given the dynamics of what has been
endured, it is not surprising that domestic violence victims tend to blend, generalize and
summarize when narrating a history of abuse.”).
112
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criminal law’s,115 recognizing that emotional abuse can be as harmful or more
harmful than physical abuse,116 and closing a perceived gap in the law.117
1. English Law
As in the United States, the English criminal justice system historically
criminalized domestic violence through general criminal offenses that
prosecutors and courts applied in the domestic violence context.118
Accordingly, a similar gap existed under English law in 2014, when
lawmakers floated the idea of new domestic violence legislation.
Before passing the new law, the Government consulted with voters to
determine the public’s thoughts on the potential law.119 Initially, there was
some question of whether an offense specifically focused on domestic
violence was necessary.120 Some survey respondents suggested that the
legislature should instead adapt harassment and stalking laws for domestic
violence purposes.121 Ultimately, though, the British Parliament decided to
create a separate offense, specifically tailored to address coercive controlling
violence.122
Important to the lawmakers’ approach to crafting the new legislation
was their separation of physical violence from other forms of domestic

HOME OFFICE, STRENGTHENING THE LAW ON DOMESTIC ABUSE—A CONSULTATION 11
(2014) [hereinafter STRENGTHENING THE LAW ON DOMESTIC ABUSE—A CONSULTATION],
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/344674/Strengthening_the_law_on_Domestic_Abuse_-_A_Consultation_WEB.PDF
[https://perma.cc/G7EC-V5N7].
116
JUST. COMM., SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT, STAGE 1 REPORT ON THE DOMESTIC ABUSE
(SCOTLAND) BILL 11 (2017) [hereinafter STAGE 1 REPORT ON THE DOMESTIC ABUSE
(SCOTLAND) BILL], https://sp-bpr-en-prod-cdnep.azureedge.net/published/J/2017/9/21/Stage1-Report-on-the-Domestic-Abuse--Scotland--Bill/Stage%201%20Report%20on%20the%20
Domestic%20Abuse%20(Scotland)%20Bill.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FZX-3P6Z].
117
Id. at 3–4.
118
See Vanessa Bettinson & Charlotte Bishop, Is the Creation of a Discrete Offence of
Coercive Control Necessary to Combat Domestic Violence?, 66 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 179, 185
(2015) (“The primary legislation used to prosecute perpetrators of domestic violence and/or
abuse remains the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and the common law offences of
assault and battery.”).
119
HOME OFFICE, STRENGTHENING THE LAW ON DOMESTIC ABUSE—A SUMMARY OF
RESPONSES 6 (2014), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/upl
oads/attachment_data/file/389002/StrengtheningLawDomesticAbuseResponses.pdf [https://p
erma.cc/5NEB-W2PE].
120
Id.
121
Id. at 7.
122
Id. at 11.
115
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abuse.123 A report from the Home Office stated that there was “no need for
greater clarity around violent behaviours, which are effectively criminalised
through existing offenses.”124
The 2015 law—passed as a section of the “Serious Crime Act 2015”—
reads as follows:
A person (A) commits an offence if –
A repeatedly or continuously engages in behavior towards another person (B)
that is controlling or coercive,
At the time of the behavior, A and B are personally connected
The behavior has a serious effect on B, and
A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will have a serious effect on B.125

The statute specifies that A and B are personally connected if they are
in an intimate relationship, live together and are family members, or live
together and have previously been in an intimate relationship.126 A “serious
effect” means that it “causes B to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence
will be used against B,” or that, “it causes B serious alarm or distress which
has a substantial adverse effect on B’s usual day-to-day activities.”127 A
person convicted of the offense will receive a fine, up to five years in prison,
or both.128
What the law chooses not to define, or leaves out altogether, is just as
important as these definitions. The law does not define “controlling” or
“coercive.”129 It does not specify gender, nor does it include a statute of
See STRENGTHENING THE LAW ON DOMESTIC ABUSE—A CONSULTATION, supra note
115, at 11.
124
Id.
125
Serious Crime Act 2015, c. 9, § 76 (U.K.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015
/9/pdfs/ukpga_20150009_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DLL-W2L9].
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
See id. Statutory guidance from the Home Office, however, states that “[c]ontrolling
behaviour is: a range of acts designed to make a person subordinate and/or dependent by
isolating them from sources of support, exploiting their resources and capacities for personal
gain, depriving them of the means needed for independence, resistance and escape and
regulating their everyday behaviour.” HOME OFFICE, CONTROLLING OR COERCIVE BEHAVIOUR
IN AN INTIMATE OR FAMILY RELATIONSHIP: STATUTORY GUIDANCE FRAMEWORK 3 (2015),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/482528/Controlling_or_coercive_behaviour_-_statutory_guidance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YC96-U47A]. It further defines “coercive behaviour” as “a continuing act
or a pattern of acts of assault, threats, humiliation and intimidation or other abuse that is used
to harm, punish, or frighten their victim.” Id. But the guidance also emphasizes that this is
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limitations.130 Finally, as already mentioned, although one could interpret the
statute to cover physical violence because “behavior” is such a broad term,
the Act’s history suggests that Parliament did not intend for it to do so.131 I
will analyze the English law below, alongside my analysis of Ireland and
Scotland’s laws.
2. Irish Law
Three years after the British Parliament passed the Serious Crime Act,
Ireland passed the Domestic Violence Act 2018. In addition to expanding
access to protection orders and introducing protections to domestic violence
victims during court proceedings, the Act introduced a new criminal offense,
which, like England and Wales’s, was called “coercive control.”132 The first
section of the offense reads:
(1) A person commits an offence where he or she knowingly and persistently engages
in behaviour that—
(a) is controlling or coercive,
(b) has a serious effect on a relevant person, and
(c) a reasonable person would consider likely to have a serious effect on a relevant
person.133

The Irish offense is very similar to the English version that proceeded
it, but it features at least three significant differences. The first is that the
mens rea requirement differs significantly from England and Wales’s Serious
Crime Act, which considers what the defendant knew or ought to have known
with regard to the effect of his or her behavior. The Domestic Violence Act,
however, raises the mens rea requirement to “knowingly.”134 Additionally,
what perpetrators must know differs between the two laws. Under the English
law, the perpetrator must either have known or ought to have known that his
behavior would “have a serious effect on” his victim. On the other hand,
although the Domestic Violence Act’s wording is somewhat ambiguous, it
appears to require that the prosecutor prove that an offender actually knows
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See id.
See STRENGTHENING THE LAW ON DOMESTIC ABUSE—A CONSULTATION, supra note
115, at 11 (explaining that English law does not require “greater clarity around violent
behaviours, which are effectively criminalised through existing offences”).
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Domestic Violence Act 2018, (Act. no. 6/2018, § 39) (Ir.).
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that his behavior is controlling or coercive.135 This requirement places a high
burden of proof on prosecutors.136
The second difference is that, unlike England and Wales’s Serious
Crime Act, Ireland’s Domestic Violence Act explicitly incorporates physical
violence into the offense. Section 40 of the Act stipulates that where an
offender’s “coercive control” involves violence or a threat of violence, courts
shall treat that fact as an aggravating factor and the sentence will increase
accordingly.137 In this way, Ireland’s Domestic Violence Act improves the
English law because it acknowledges that abusers may seek to gain control
over their victims through both physically violent and nonphysically violent
behaviors as part of the same course of conduct. Still, by providing for greater
sentencing where physical violence exists, Ireland’s law also sends a clear
message that physical violence is more blameworthy, more harmful, or both
than other controlling behavior. This conflicts with many victims’
experiences.138
Finally, Ireland’s Domestic Violence Act does not stipulate how many
acts it requires to prove the offense, only that the offender must engage in
“persistent” behavior.139 Although leaving room for interpretation and
prosecutorial discretion is not necessarily a bad thing, without at least a
minimum number of acts, it is difficult to understand how prosecutors can
bring these cases with certainty that they have gathered sufficient evidence.
3. Scottish Law
The third and most recently passed law is the Domestic Abuse
(Scotland) Act 2018 (“Domestic Abuse Act”). Leading up to the Act’s
passage, a Committee Report noted that the drafters intended the law to
address concerns that the criminal law did not cover the lived experiences of
many domestic violence victims.140 The committee sought to address these
concerns “by recognising . . . domestic abuse as a course of conduct taking
place over a period of time, rather than the focus being on a single incident,
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See Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering, supra note 24,
at 1022 (“[P]rosecutors would understandably balk at a requirement that intentional mens rea
be proven with respect to the exercise of power and control. The difficulty of convincing jurors
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practically insurmountable.”).
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as is ordinarily the case with the criminal law.”141 Furthermore, in contrast to
the drafters of the English and Irish statutes, the drafters of Scotland’s
Domestic Abuse Act intentionally used a “gendered analysis” of domestic
violence in framing the law.142 The drafters’ starting point was, in essence,
“the view that women and girls are at increased risk of violence and abuse by
nature of their gender, from men.”143 The law itself, however, uses gender
neutral terms. The law reads:
(1) A person commits an offence if—
(a) the person (“A”) engages in a course of behaviour which is abusive of A’s partner
or ex-partner (“B”), and
(b) both of the further conditions are met.
(2) The further conditions are—
(a) that a reasonable person would consider the course of behaviour to be likely to cause
B to suffer physical or psychological harm,
(b) that either—
(i) A intends by the course of behaviour to cause B to suffer physical or psychological
harm, or
(ii) A is reckless as to whether the course of behaviour causes B to suffer physical or
psychological harm.144

The law further stipulates that “psychological harm” includes fear,
alarm, and distress.145 It defines “behaviour which is abusive” as including
violent, threatening, or intimidating behavior, as well as behavior that “has
as its purpose (or among its purposes)” one or more of the following effects:
“(a) making B dependent on, or subordinate to, A, (b) isolating B from
friends, relatives or other sources of support, (c) controlling, regulating or
monitoring B’s day-to-day activities, (d) depriving B of, or restricting B’s,
freedom of action, [or] (e) frightening, humiliating, degrading or punishing
B.”146
Abusive behavior under the law includes behavior that “would be
considered by a reasonable person to be likely to have one or more” of the
above effects.147 The law defines behavior broadly as “behaviour ‘of any
141
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Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018, (ASP 5) § 1, ¶¶ 1–2, https://www.legislation.g
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kind’ that may include communicating something . . . or failing to
communicate or do something.”148 Additionally, “[b]ehaviour directed at a
person” includes both conduct toward that person’s property and conduct that
makes use of a third party.149

4. The Scottish Law as a Model for State Legislation
Scotland’s Domestic Abuse Act provides the best model for states to
use when drafting their own laws because the Scottish law solves a number
of the problems presented by the English and Irish laws. One important
feature of the Scottish law is that, like the Irish law, Scotland’s Domestic
Abuse Act explicitly incorporates physical harm into the offense.150 This is
significant because including physical harm along with other controlling
behaviors represents a more accurate and complete understanding of how
abusers abuse their victims, as well as how domestic violence victims
experience that abuse.151
Furthermore, the Scottish statute does not require that the prosecutor
prove that the victim suffered any harm, nor does it require proof that abusers
gained control over their victims.152 This means that, rather than proving the
victim’s suffering, the prosecutor—and the jury—must focus on the alleged
abuser’s behavior. In contrast, requiring prosecutors to prove the abuse’s
“effect” on the victim, as the Irish law does, is problematic because the
degree of agency that domestic violence victims retain in the face of abuse
should not diminish the abuser’s culpability.153 Instead, the Domestic Abuse
Act requires the prosecutor to prove that a reasonable person would view the
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See Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering, supra note 24,
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abuser’s behavior as likely to cause the victim to suffer physical or
psychological harm.154
The Scottish law’s scienter requirement is also less burdensome on
prosecutors than the English law’s. Though the English law appears to
require the prosecutor to prove that an offender knew that his behavior was
controlling or coercive,155 the Scottish law requires that the prosecutor prove
that an abuser intentionally or recklessly caused the victim to suffer physical
or psychological harm.156 As mentioned above, the specificity of the English
law’s scienter requirement will likely make it far more difficult for
prosecutors to prove the crime and perhaps deter them from bringing charges
at all.157 This difficulty stems from the fact that abusers may not actually
know that their behavior is controlling or coercive. And, even if abusers do
understand the precise nature their behavior, it is not obvious what sort of
evidence a prosecutor could present to prove this knowledge, particularly
when most other criminal statutes do not require such a specific showing of
scienter. Proof of an intention to cause harm, on the other hand, is already
required under various existing criminal statutes.158 And the Scottish law’s
requirement that the offender must only be “reckless” as to whether his
conduct causes the victim to suffer physical or psychological harm reduces
the burden of proof on prosecutors even further.
One additional benefit of Scotland’s Domestic Abuse Act is that it is far
more detailed and specific than the English and Irish laws. The law’s specific
definition of “abusive behavior,” as well as its specific enumeration of the
Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018, (ASP 5) § 2, ¶ 2. The drafters explain: “It is the
Scottish Government’s view that proving a crime was committed should not hang on
demonstrating in court that the complainer suffered harm. The Scottish Government considers
that this reduces the likelihood of the trial process being traumatic for the victim (by forcing
them to ‘re-live’ the experience of the abuse in order to establish that the crime was
committed). It also means that the fact that a particular individual was resilient in the face of
the abuse is of no relevance to the prosecution case. Instead, the focus is on what the accused
actually did (or failed to do), on whether they had the requisite mental element of recklessness
or intent, and on an objective assessment of what the outcome for the victim would likely have
been.” STAGE 1 REPORT ON THE DOMESTIC ABUSE (SCOTLAND) BILL, supra note 116, at 7.
155
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practically insurmountable.”).
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relevant effects on the victim, give Scottish citizens—including police,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges—a much clearer picture as to who
this law is meant to protect and from what it is meant to protect them.159 In
contrast, the Irish and English laws do not elaborate on “behavior” at all.
Finally, the Scottish law also makes clear how many incidents of abuse
prosecutors must demonstrate to prove the crime occurred: two.160 As
mentioned above, providing prosecutors with clear guidelines about what the
offense involves as well as the number of incidents the law requires them to
prove is crucial to the crime’s implementation and success. Accordingly, the
Scottish law provides the best model for states to use when drafting courseof-conduct domestic violence legislation.
III. COUNTERARGUMENTS AND CHALLENGES
Although the Scottish law is the best solution, it is not perfect. Important
and valid questions about the intersection of domestic violence and the
criminal justice system remain. More specifically, one might question
whether the criminal justice system is the most appropriate way to address
domestic violence in our society at all. This Part will address this concern.
In recent years, many scholars have questioned both the efficacy and the
morality of relying on the criminal law to address domestic violence. Some
point to the system’s continued reliance on incarceration in the domestic
violence context as a feminist failure.161 In particular, scholars point to
mandatory arrest laws,162 no-drop policies,163 and other practices designed to
increase enforcement of domestic violence laws as having the unanticipated
and unfortunate effect of undermining the victim’s autonomy.164
159

See Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018, (ASP 5) §§ 1–2, ¶ 4.
Id. § 10, ¶ 4.
161
See, e.g., Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 748 (2007)
(“By embracing harsh criminalization policies, domestic violence reformers actually strayed
from the underlying values of the feminist movement.”); LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED
MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 1–6 (2012) (criticizing dominance
feminists’ strategy of relying on the state to address and protect women from domestic
violence and arguing that the legal system’s response to domestic violence “has proven
problematic for many women”); Leigh Goodmark, Should Domestic Violence Be
Decriminalized?, 40 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 53, 70–88 (2017) (detailing critiques of the
criminalization of domestic violence and arguments for decriminalization).
162
Mandatory arrest laws require law enforcement to arrest alleged abusers. Justine A
Dunlap, Soft Misogyny: The Subtle Perversion of Domestic Violence “Reform,” 46 SETON
HALL L. REV. 775, 793 (2016).
163
No-drop policies require prosecutors to pursue charges against abusers without
consideration for whether survivors support the bringing of these charges. Id. at 797–98.
164
See, e.g., id. at 792–809 (chronicling ways these and other criminal justice policies
have had negative consequences for domestic violence survivors).
160

802

MANRING

[Vol. 111

Furthermore, in a country that is currently struggling under the burden of
mass incarceration, calling for legislatures to create new criminal offenses—
particularly ones that may lead to higher sentencing—may be rightly met
with skepticism.
But while feminist concerns about mass-incarceration generally and
criminalizing domestic violence specifically are well-taken, there are
important reasons to criminalize domestic violence, and there could be
serious consequences if legislatures do not. The first reason is that domestic
violence in its patterned, ongoing forms, involves the subjugation of another
person. It is a sustained deprivation of another person’s agency and liberty.165
This feature of domestic violence makes it different from other conduct our
laws define as criminal, such as drug possession, which, in theory, only
directly injures the possessor and could only indirectly injure others.166 It
seems uncontroversial to say that crimes perpetrators commit to subjugate
and control other individuals cause greater social harm and are therefore
more worthy of retribution and deterrence than crimes that do not. Thus,
domestic violence is distinct from other criminal behaviors—such as drug
possession—that have been rightly criticized for both excessive sentencing
and over-criminalization.
Second, while some critics of the criminal justice system and criminal
law in general might find its underlying goals of retribution and deterrence
misguided, even ignoring these justifications, the goals of incapacitation and
isolation are highly important in the domestic violence context. If the system
does not separate abusers from victims, victims remain at risk.167 This is
particularly true given abusers’ tendency to repeatedly abuse a particular
victim in a way that escalates over time.168
165
See STARK, supra note 12, at 15 (“What is taken from [victims] . . . is the capacity for
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VAND. L. REV. 681, 711 (2018).
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Finally, as long as domestic violence statutes remain on the books, they
should accurately capture both abusers’ conduct and victims’ harm.169
Current domestic violence statutes do not. These statutes’ accuracy is
important because of the criminal law’s expressive function: our criminal
statutes not only reflect behavior that society already condemns, but also
prescribe behavior that society should condemn. In this way, criminal statutes
shape societal understandings of what is and is not permissible conduct and
communicate to victims that the harm they have suffered is real and of the
kind that society will not tolerate.170 A consequence of the law incorrectly
defining domestic violence, then, is that society continues to misunderstand
what domestic violence is, how it occurs, and why it is harmful. These
omissions in our current laws, therefore, have real consequences for both
victims and society at large. Said differently, “what the law quietly calls legal
becomes, or remains, socially legitimate.”171 Accordingly, though criminal
justice reforms are important and necessary, this is not the area reformists
should target.
CONCLUSION
Domestic violence statutes in the United States are changing in ways
that suggest the legal field is ready to grapple with a more realistic
understanding of domestic violence and its perpetration. Despite these
improvements, however, the structure of U.S. domestic violence statutes,
which still define domestic violence as an isolated event, remains flawed.
Accordingly, the United States should follow the lead of countries that are
addressing the ways that transactional criminal statutes fail domestic
violence victims. The best path forward is for states to pass legislation
defining domestic violence as a course of conduct, using Scotland’s law as a
model.
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